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Place and Time Authentication of Cultural
Assets
Leonardo Mostarda, Changyu Dong, and Naranker Dulay
Abstract This paper proposes a place and time authentication system for cultural
assets. We develop a protocol that combines traditional cryptographic techniques
with place and time information to generate a secure tag for each cultural asset.
We model the attacker capabilities and show that our secure tag helps ensure the
authenticity of works of art. Our system has been deployed and validated in Italian
and Greek museums in the context of CUSPIS project.
1 Introduction
Art appreciation dates back more than two-thousand years when Roman sculptors
produced copies of Greek sculptures for religious inspiration or simply for aesthetic
enjoyment. Over the years art has become a commercial commodity and unautho-
rised copying an illegal but highly profitable business. Counterfeit cultural assets
are sold in auctions and even exhibited around the world. The trade in counterfeit
artworks and antiques is a six billion dollar per year business and the largest crime
after drug and gun trafficking [1]. For instance in Operation “Canale”, the Italian
police sequestered 20,000 pieces of paintings and graphics works. Of all the pieces,
17,000 of them were imitations and ready to be sold. In 2006 about 2,000 Italian
and French exhibitions were visited by 44 million people with an average fee of 6.3
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euros per person [2]. It has been estimated that five percent of such profits have been
made by exhibitions of counterfeit cultural assets.
The main reason for the increase in criminal activity is the inadequacy of coun-
termeasures. Traditionally, the authenticity of a cultural asset is provided by a paper
certificate issued by a recognised authority such as a museum. The experts from the
authority examine the provenance, i.e. the documented history of the asset, the style
of the artist, and they use forensic methods (e.g. carbon dating [3], thermolumi-
nescence [4] and statistical analysis of digital images [5]) to verify the authenticity
of the cultural asset. If they believe this asset is authentic, they sign a certificate
containing details of the cultural asset.
The main problem with paper certificates is obvious: the certificates can be forged
or duplicated and then presented with counterfeit works of art that are shown in an
exhibition or sold in an auction.
This paper describes a novel place and time authentication system to detect coun-
terfeit cultural assets. The system generates a tag for each cultural asset that holds
the location where, and the time when, the cultural asset can be shown, as well as a
cultural asset description, for example, a picture or text signed by an authenticator.
Visitors to an exhibition, or potential buyers at an auction can read the cultural as-
set’s tag and use location and time data to check the authenticity of the asset. The
digital signature is used to ensure the integrity of the tag data and the authenticator’s
identity. Although a valid tag can still be copied by an attacker, its use in a different
place and time is detectable. To mitigate the tag duplication and reuse problem in
the same place and time, the authentication process provides a history-based check
and also signed descriptive information for users to check. The history based check
analyses each new tag to determine if it is a previously verified tag or if it is a du-
plicated tag, while the descriptive information can include photos of the asset and
place in the tag.
In this paper we formalise the place and time authentication system and establish
a threat model. We then show that the system ensures the authenticity of cultural as-
sets. The system has been validated in the context of the CUSPIS European project
[6]. For outdoor use, it uses EGNOS, the European Geostationary Navigation Over-
lay Service, a precursor of the Galileo satellite infrastructure[7]. For indoor use it
requires users to check location information stored in RFID and graphical bar codes
that users download and run on their mobile device (e.g. PDA or smart phone). It
should be pointed out that the approach is independent of the location service, for
example, we could use cell-tower or wifi access-point triangulation for indoor ap-
plications.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the use cases, the
threat model and the system requirements. In Section 3, we provide an overview
of the place and time authentication system. In Section 4, we define the formal
model of our system and provide security proofs. In Section 5, we evaluate the
implementation of the system. Finally, sections 6 and 7 discuss related work and
provide conclusions.
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2 Use cases and system requirements
In this section, we motivate our approach with two use cases, highlight potential
attacks and outline the overall requirements of the system.
2.1 Use cases
We consider two different but similar scenarios, namely exhibitions and auctions.
Figure 1 shows the entities involved and their relations. An entity is represented
either as a stylized person or as an object. A line connecting two entities models
some relationship between them.
End user
Qualified 
organization
Cultural asset
Owner
Official 
department
Exhibitor / Dealer
Fig. 1 The entities involved in the use cases
The following entities are involved: (i) a cultural asset; (ii) the owner of the cul-
tural asset; (iii) a qualified organisation that authenticates the asset, e.g. a museum
or a research institute; (iv) an official department that manages the qualification of
(iii); (v) an exhibitor/dealer; (vi) an end user.
A cultural asset is a valuable object with social or artistic significance. For exam-
ple, an ancient Roman sculpture or a Picasso painting. The owner can be a person or
an organisation e..g museum. In the exhibition case, the exhibitor hires the cultural
asset from the owner; in the auction case, the owner sells the cultural asset through
a dealer. In both cases, the cultural asset needs to go through an authentication pro-
cess. The authentication is performed by a qualified organisation. The qualification
of such organisations is managed by an official department. For instance, in Greece
and Italy, the ministries of cultural heritage manage such qualifications. The qualifi-
cation is granted based on the speciality, the technical strength and the reputation of
the organisation. The qualification aims to provide some guarantee on the trustwor-
thiness of authentication results. The same organisation can have different qualifi-
cations related to different types of cultural assets that they can authenticate. After
authenticating a cultural asset, the organisation generates a certification vouching
for the authenticity of the cultural asset.
If the cultural asset is to be exhibited, then it must be transported to the exhi-
bition site and remains there until the end of the exhibition. After the exhibition,
the cultural asset must be returned to the owner. If the cultural asset is to be sold
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in an auction then it must be kept securely by the organisation. After the auction,
if someone buys it, it must be securely transferred to the buyer; if the auction fails,
it must be returned to its owner. The reason why the cultural asset is kept securely
by the organisation during the auction is that otherwise the owner and dealer could
collude and send a counterfeited asset to the auction and keep the original one.
Among all the entities involved, (iii) and (iv) can usually be trusted. The organi-
sation that provides authentication of cultural assets is unlikely to cheat because this
will damage its reputation and it can be held liable if found providing false results.
The official department has the ultimate responsibility of protecting the authentic-
ity of the cultural assets and is the one motivated most to fight counterfeit cultural
assets. The owner and the exhibitor/dealer are not trusted because they can benefit
from counterfeiting the assets. The cultural asset itself is a passive object in the sys-
tem. The end user is normally the victim of counterfeit cultural assets and in need
of protection.
2.2 Threats and potential attacks
In the scenarios described above, we highlight the following attacks to the traditional
certification system:
• Certificate forgery. The attacker can forge a cultural asset and a certificate from
an authority which claims it is an unrevealed work of a famous artist or a newly
discovered antiquity.
• Certificate modification. The attacker can modify a certificate to claim it has a
higher value.
• Swapping. The attacker who has a cultural asset and its certificate, counterfeits
the asset and swaps the real one with the fake one.
• Certificate reuse. The attacker who has a certificate for a cultural asset issued by
an authority counterfeits the asset and reuses the certificate.
• Certificate duplication. The attacker duplicates a certificate for a cultural asset
issued by an authority, counterfeits the asset and uses the duplicated certificate.
• Certificate replication. The attacker who has the cultural asset obtains different
valid certificates and uses them in counterfeit ones.
2.3 System requirements
The goal of our place and time authentication system is to stop the illegal profits
made from counterfeit cultural assets. We propose the use of digital tags to pre-
vent counterfeit cultural assets entering circulation through auctions and detect them
from being shown in exhibitions. The high level requirements of the digital tags are:
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• Providing authentication. End users must be convinced they are viewing or buy-
ing an authentic cultural asset after they verify its tag.
• Non-forgeable. No one can forge a tag and claim it was generated by a trusted
entity.
• Integrity. After being generated, no one can modify the contents of the tag.
• Non-reusable. The tag can be used only once.
• Anti-duplication. It should be hard to duplicate the tag or use the duplicated tags
without being detected.
• Tag uniqueness. For each cultural asset there must be exactly one valid tag at the
same time.
• Off-line operation. Most of the operations should be able to be performed off-line
without recourse to online services.
We emphasise that conventional digital certificates/credentials are non-forgeable
and can provide integrity, but they can be easily duplicated and reused. Therefore,
as shown in the following sections, our digital tags use place and time information
to address the aforementioned problems.
3 Overview of approach
In this section we show how our place and time authentication system can be added
to the cultural asset life cycle in order to enhance security. Our approach is com-
posed of the following phases: (i) certification; (ii) tag generation and revocation;
and (iii) authentication.
3.1 Certification phase
Official
department
1. 
qualification
organization
2.cert
ificate 
g
eneration
Digital certificate
     Serial number
     Algorithm ID
     Issuer
     Validity
- Not Before
- Not After
     Subject
     Subject Public Key Info
     Extensions 
     Signature Algorithm 
     Certificate Signature 
     Issuer Unique Identifier
     Subject Unique Identifier
Fig. 2 The certification phase
In the certification phase organisations that claim to be qualified to check assets
(e.g. a museum) interact with an official department (i.e., a government authority)
in order to obtain a digital qualification. This certification phase is composed of two
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basic steps: (i) qualification; and (ii) certificate generation. In the first step the organ-
isation gets in touch with the certification authority, fills on some forms and proves
its identity. The certification authority conducts a comprehensive evaluation of the
technical and nontechnical merits of the organisation to establish the extent to which
the organisation’s ability in authenticating cultural assets meets its set of specified
requirements. If the organisation qualifies, the certification authority generates a cer-
tificate for it. The certificate (see Figure 2) is an X509 v3 digital certificate [8]. This
certificate is identified by a serial number and contains: the issuer (e.g., the certi-
fication authority) information, the subject (e.g., the organisation) information, the
period of validity, the public key of the organisation and the issuer signature. More-
over, the extensions field can contain additional accreditation constraints, e.g. the
organisation is approved to authenticate certain types of cultural assets. The related
private key must be kept safely. 1 For instance in the CUSPIS project the certifica-
tion authorities are the Italian and Greek Ministries of Cultural Heritage. Certificates
have been released to Roman museums and to the National Museum of Athens.
3.2 Tag generation and revocation phases
In Figure 3 the tag generation revocation phases.
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Fig. 3 The tag generation phase
In the tag generation phase an qualified organisation checks a cultural asset, if
it is ”authentic”, the organisation generates a place and time based tag (GD) for
it. A GD (see Figure 3) contains the following fields: (i) a Unique Code (UC); (ii)
the organisation certificate (C); (iii) the destination area (DA); (iv) the starting time
(ST); (v) the end time (ET); (vi) extensions; (vii) the organisation signature (S).
The UC field is an identifier that uniquely identifies the cultural asset. The field
C contains the digital certificate of the organisation which is generated in the certi-
fication phase (see section 3.1). The destination area field (DA) defines the location
where the cultural asset will be exhibited/sold. The starting and end time denote the
period in which the cultural asset will be exhibited or the period of the auction. The
1 In the CUSPIS project, the private keys are generated by the certification authorities and sealed
into a tamper-proof device which is delivered securely to the organisations.
Place and Time Authentication of Cultural Assets 7
extensions fields contains information for users to uniquely identify the cultural as-
set, e.g., a description, a picture of the asset and place, the owner, the cultural asset
origin and so on. The organisation signature (S) is a standard digital signature of the
GD that is generated using the organisation’s private key.
The GD can be stored and attached to the cultural asset in different ways. For
instance, in the CUSPIS project, we use both RFID tags 2 and graphical bar code
(e.g., a shot code and QR code) tags to store the GD. The end user can read the RFID
tags with a PDA or take a picture of the graphical bar code with a mobile device in
order to obtain the GD.
The tag revocation phase is undertaken by an owner that wishes to withdraw its
cultural asset from an exhibition/auction. To this aim the owner shows its GD to
the organisation that reads it, verifies the signature S and checks the owner identity.
If the GD is successfully verified then the organization updates the revocation list
of the exhibition/auction where the cultural asset was destined for. In our imple-
mentation revocation lists are updated through a trusted logically centralised web
site.
Organisations must take further measures to avoid a replication attack. A repli-
cation attack can result as a consequence of users asking for a new GD without
revoking the old one. For instance if an owner has a two year tag, GD, for his cul-
tural asset and he has lent it to an exhibition. Now suppose that the exhibitor uses
the cultural asset to obtain a new tag, GD1, counterfeits the cultural asset and sells
it to an auction. Then we are in a situation where two valid tags, at the same time,
are used. Our approach is to require that organisations update and use a logically
centralised data base of GDs. After an organisation authenticates a cultural asset it
must query the DB with asset information 3. In the case that a valid GD is currently
issued then the organisation requires that the owner performs a revocation process.
We emphasise that this is not the only solution to deal with the replication attack.
For instance, if we assume that we have only short term GDs there is no need for
both database and revocation lists.
Although cultural asset authentication requires organisations to have ”cumber-
some” tools, update a logically centralised DB and have specialised skills [10, 3,
4, 5], users can easily read all GDs and perform off line authentication with simple
widespread devices (e.g., PDA).
3.3 The Authentication phase
In the authentication phase (see Figure 4), the end user reads a GD and verifies the
authenticity of the related cultural asset. To this end the user employs mobile device
2 We used RFID tags with 128KB of memory that maintain full compatibility with the EPC stan-
dard [9].
3 In our current implementation, cultural asset search is performed based on the cultural asset type,
period, weight and author. However, other techniques such as fingerprinting [10] are available to
produce a unique ID for each cultural asset.
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Fig. 4 The authentication phase
(e.g. a PDA) equipped with a verification component, a positioning component, two
revocation lists and a time component. The main steps performed in the verification
process are replication checking, digital certificate verification, GD digital signa-
ture verification, place and time verification, object verification, and duplication
checking.
In the replication checking step, the verification component verifies that the GD
is not present in the GD revocation list 4. The GD revocation list can be down-
loaded from a trusted web site and installed prior to the verification. In particular, if
a user has decided the places he wishes to visit (cities/museums/auctions), only the
revocation lists for those places need to be downloaded.
In the digital certificate verification step the verification component reads the
certificate (C) contained in the GD tag and performs the usual verification on digital
certificates [8]. The public key of the certification authority and revocation lists can
be downloaded from a trusted web site and installed prior to the verification.
In the GD digital signature verification step, the verification component reads
the signature field (S) from the GD and verifies it by using the public key retrieved
from the certificate (C).
In the place and time verification step, the verification component contacts the
positioning component and the time component to get the user’s current position
and time. It is worth noting that the positioning component and the time compo-
nent must ensure the correctness of the information they provide, this can be done
by signal authentication and cross-checking. For instance, in the CUSPIS project,
the Authentication Navigation Messages (ANM) service [11] provided by Galileo
satellite systems could be used for providing reliable position information. The ver-
ification component verifies that the current user position is inside the destination
area (DA) contained in the GD tag. Moreover, it verifies that the current time is
greater than the start time (ST) and less than the end time (ET).
In the object verification step, the verification component verifies that the charac-
teristics of the cultural asset and place meet the identification information contained
in the extension field of the GD. The end user is involved in this step. The verifica-
tion component presents the identification information to the end user and the end
user provides the verification result.
4 The search inside the revocation lists is performed based on the GD digital signature S, the UC
code and the owner
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If any of the steps fail, then the authentication fails. Otherwise, the verification
component checks the authentication history in the period of this exhibition tour /
auction to see whether the GD has been duplicated, i.e. to perform a duplication
checking step.
In the exhibition case, the authentication history is a sequence of (GD,POS) tu-
ples where GD is a verified tag and POS is the user position when this tag was
read. Suppose that a user is verifying a tag GD at the position POS, and a tuple
(GD,POS′) is in the authentication history (i.e., the tag GD has already been vis-
ited). Then when POS is sufficiently far from POS′ the verification component con-
cludes that the tag has been duplicated. As we are going to see in Section 5 the
notion of sufficiently far is strictly related to the technologies used to implement the
system.
In the auction case, the authentication history is just a sequence of verified GDs,
this is because in the auction, the cultural assets are presented one after another and
the user does not change the position. If any in the sequence is the same as the one
being verified, a duplication is detected. When the verification component detects a
duplication, it raises an alarm and marks both as duplicated.
If all the steps succeed, then the authentication succeeds and the end user can be
assured that the cultural asset is not counterfeited.
4 Security analysis
In this section, we provide a formal model of the system and discuss the security
of our authentication system. Since the system is designed for special use cases, we
do not intend to, and believe it would be difficult to, prove it is secure in a general
settings. The security analysis in this section is bound to a specific context and
certain assumptions, for example, in the analysis, we do not consider any attacks at
the physical level, e.g. theft, destruction etc.
4.1 Modeling
The system is modeled as a tuple (A ,A ′,I ,C ,O,P,T ,CERT ,GD) whose
elements are disjointed sets described as follows:
• A is the set of all cultural assets.A ′ is the set of counterfeit assets. counter f eit :
A → 2A ′ is a partial function. For a cultural asset a ∈A , counter f eit(a) ∈ 2A ′
are the counterfeit items of a. A 0 is defined as A ∪A ′. I is the set of all
identifiers. We also define a surjection mapping function ID :A 0 →I , such that
for all a,b∈A ,a 6= b if and only if ID(a) 6= ID(b) and for all a,b∈A 0, ID(a) =
ID(b) if and only if we can find x ∈ A such that a,b ∈ (x∪ counter f eit(x)).
Loosely speaking, this means that each real cultural asset has a unique identifier
and the counterfeit items can be identified as the real asset.
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• C is the set of all certification authorities in our system, i.e. the official depart-
ments. O is the set of all qualified organisations. Let E = C ∪O , a function
pk : E →{0,1}k defines the public key for each entity in E , where k is a security
parameter.
• P is the set of places. Function in :P×P → boolean returns true if and only
the first places lies within the second place.
• T is the set of times. Two times are comparable such that t1 < t2 and t2 > t1 if
and only if t1 is a time point before t2, t1 = t2 if they refer to the same time point.
≤,≥ are defined as abbreviations.
• CERT is the set of all valid certificates. Functions sub ject : CERT → O ,
issuer : CERT → C , spk : CERT →{0,1}k are defined to return the subject,
the issuer and the subject public key field in the certificate. Function certSig :
CERT →{0,1}m returns the signature of the certificate.
• GD is the set of all GDs created by the organisations. Function getCert : GD →
CERT extracts the certificate embedded in the GD. Function da : GD→P re-
turns the destination area. validity : GD → (T ,T ) returns the (start,end) time
period. idIn f o : GD → I returns the identification information of the cultural
asset stored in the extension field. Function GDSig : GD → {0,1}m returns the
signature of the GD.
• For every public key key, key−1 denotes the related private key. Function sign :
{0,1}∗×{0,1}k → {0,1}m generates a signature over a message using a pri-
vate key. Function checkSign : {0,1}∗ × {0,1}m × {0,1}k → boolean checks
the validity of a signature. checkSign(m,sig,key) = true if and only if sig =
sign(m,key−1). We assume the cryptographic schemes are perfect. We also as-
sume that each private key is only known by its owner.
With the model, we can formalise the authentication process in section 3.3 as
shown in Fig. 5.
4.2 Proof sketch
For the sake of presentation, here we only sketch the proofs informally. The goal of
authentication in our system is: given an asset a and a GD gd, current time t and
place p, an authentication history in the period of the exhibition/auction history, de-
cide whether the asset is real, i.e. a ∈A . It is clear that t, p and history come from
trusted sources and the attacker can manipulate the (a,gd) tuple. Let “real asset” de-
note a ∈A , “fake asset” denote a ∈A ′, “matched tag” denote gd ∈ GD , ID(a) =
idIn f o(gd), “unmatched tag” denote gd ∈ GD , ID(a) 6= idIn f o(gd),“fake tag” de-
note gd 6∈ GD . Then there are six cases for the (a,gd) tuple: (i) a is a real asset
and gd is a matched tag; (ii) a is a real asset and gd is a unmatched tag; (iii) a is
a real asset and gd is a fake tag; (iv) a is a fake asset and gd is a matched tag; (v)
a is a fake asset and gd is a unmatched tag; (vi) a is a fake asset and gd is a fake
tag. Obviously, our authentication system is secure if the system returns true only
in case (i).
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authentication((a,gd), t, p,history)
Output:
true or f alse
Function:
IF gdRevoked(gd)
return f alse;
ENDIF
cert = getCert(gd);
cSig = certSig(cert);
issuer = issuer(cert);
key = pk(issuer);
IF certRevoked(cert)
return f alse;
ENDIF
IF checkSign(cert,cSig,key)
skey = spk(cert);
gdSig = GDSig(gd);
IF checkSign(gd,gdSig,skey)
(t1, t2) = validity(gd);
area = da(gd);
IF t1 ≤ t ≤ t2 and in(p,area)
id = idIn f o(gd);
IF id = ID(a)
FOR EACH (gdi, pi) in history
IF gd = gdi and p 6= pi
alarm();
return f alse;
ENDIF
ENDFOR
history = history||(gd, p);
return true;
ENDIF
ENDIF
ENDIF
ENDIF
return f alse;
Fig. 5 Algorithm for the authentication process
Now we will prove that our system is secure by enumerating all the possible
attacks and show that they are either infeasible or not sensible.
It is easy to see that cases (iii) and (vi) are not possible. Under the assumption
that the cryptographic schemes are perfect and only the owner knows the private
key, the attacker cannot produce a valid signature for the forged or modified tag.
The authentication returns f alse in such cases. It is also easy to see that cases (ii)
and (v) are not possible because the authentication will return f alse in the object
verification step.
Before going into case (iv), let’s explain the intuitions of using position and time
in our authentication system. The reason why we include position and time infor-
mation is to limit the reuse/duplication of the tags. The underlying assumption of
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the traditional certificate authentication is that the certificate is unique and is bound
to the cultural asset. Unfortunately, in real life, the assumptions rarely hold. First of
all, certificates can be duplicated, especially digital ones. Secondly, there is no way
to bind the certificate to the asset directly, it can only be bound to the identification
characteristics of the asset. This indirect binding makes the traditional system much
weaker. For a cultural asset, the identity is easy to forge. The attacker can create
a counterfeit item with the same appearance as the real asset. Then he can bind a
recycled real certificate or a duplicated certificate to the counterfeit item in order to
sell/exhibit them. Since the reuse/duplication can happen across a vast geographical-
time space, the user cannot effectively track the usage of the certificate and detect the
reuse/duplication. In our system, by using position and time as constraints, the tag
is only valid in a specific area and a specific time period, so the attacker cannot use
it or the duplicated ones in other places or other time. If the attacker reuses the tag
or uses the duplicated ones within the valid place-time space, the reuse/duplication
can be easily detected by the end user.
Returning to case (iv), given (a,gd), if the gd is issued to be used in another
time or area, the place and time verification step will fail so it will be impossible to
reuse a tag for other purposes. If the exhibitor/dealer uses a valid gd and binds it to
different assets in the same exhibition/auction, the end user can detect it because the
same gd will appear several times in the authentication history. Another possibility
of case (iv) is that a valid gd is bound to a counterfeit item, but this gd is used
only once in the exhibition/auction. In the exhibition case, the only entity who can
do so is the exhibitor, but it is not sensible for the exhibitor to do so because if
the tag is valid, it means the exhibitor has paid for the loan of the real asset and
has permission to exhibit it in the exhibition. The exhibitor gains no advantage by
exhibiting a counterfeit item while holding the real one. In the auction case, if the
tag is valid, the asset bound to it must be real because the asset bound to the tag is
authenticated and kept securely by a trusted party.
5 Implementation evaluation
Our system has been implemented and validated in the context of the CUSPIS Eu-
ropean project [6]. The Italian and Greek ministries of cultural heritage took the
role of official departments. Qualified organisations were the National Museum of
Athens and Roman museums. Exhibitions were organised in Villa Adriana (a roman
villa), in the National Museum of Athens and in several places located in Rome.
In the case of Villa Adriana (an open space area) each cultural asset was
equipped with an RFID device where the related GD is written. The destination
area written inside the GD is an ordered list of points (i.e., a polygon) where
each point is a couple of numbers (i.e., longitude and latitude). For instance
the area {(41.94231,12.77278), (41.94222,12.77538), (41.94139,12.77529),
(41.94142,12.77267)}) identifies the location of a Roman sculpture inside Villa
Adriana. Each user employs a mobile device equipped with both an RFID reader
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Fig. 6 A Roman sculpture exhibited in Villa Adriana
and a Galileo receiver. The mobile device reads the RFID information, a local key
store, the Galileo time-positioning information, the authentication history and auto-
matically checks the cultural assets authenticity. In particular the history authentica-
tion is used to check duplication as described in Section 5 by taking into account the
range of our RFID tags. If the user reads the same tag GD in two different positions
POS and POS’ then when they differ more than the RFID radius range a duplication
is found. It is worth noticing that within the RFID radius range the same GD will be
quickly detected.
In Figure 6 we show part of Villa Adriana where the aforementioned sculpture
is located. The sculpture’s RFID is physically bound to its basement. On the left
side of the picture we show the graphical user interface where the map of the villa
is shown. This map shows the location of all cultural assets and the current user
position. It is worth noticing that if the sculpture had been non-authentic a warning
message would have been shown on the mobile device.
In the case of indoor exhibitions we have written a GD on a graphical code lo-
cated next to its cultural asset. The destination area is encoded as a mail address
(Roman temporary exhibition, via Dante Alighieri, n 34B, floor 2). People can take
a picture of the code and receive all location and time information on their device. It
is worth noting that in this case that the location verification is not automatic, a user
has to read and validate the location data.
In Figure 7 we show the graphical user interface of the indoor visit. It displays
two paintings exhibited in Florence. In this case information was stored in graphical
codes located next to the paintings. A camera was used to retrieve the data and a
component of the PDA was installed to verify the authenticity of all information.
Note that a user can use the images to visually verify that the paintings are the ones
to be authenticated.
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Several GDs for different cultural assets were loaned to several museums [12].
In each museum mobile devices were used to locally perform the authentication of
cultural assets in an efficient and fast way. Moreover, GDs with some variations
have been used to transport and track cultural assets during their journey.
Our system has minimal cost for both organizations and for end users. Organiza-
tions require a normal PC and our implementation to generate the GD. When GDs
are written as graphical bar codes the museum needs only to buy the kit and they can
easily print the code on a piece of paper. When GDs are written to RFIDs the orga-
nization must add the cost of the RFIDs. Users require a cellphone with RFID/GPS
capability and a camera when GDs are stored as a graphical bar code.
Fig. 7 A picture displayed on the indoor visit
6 Related work
In this section we overview the related work in the area. We include systems sup-
porting exhibitions; some because they present approaches to discourage imitations
of valuable assets, others because they use place and time data for authentication
purposes. We also consider RFID and graphical bar code technologies since they
share our counterfeiting and integrity problems.
Systems with auto-localization functionalities are now available to help people
visiting museums avoid traditional audio/visual pre-recorded guides. For instance,
MAGA [13] is a user friendly virtual guide, that provides cultural asset informa-
tion on PDAs. The interaction between the application running on the PDA and the
environment is triggered by the detection of both passive and active RFID tags. A
passive RFID is used to hold unique ID for the cultural asset. The ID is passed
to the server application via a Wi-Fi connection in order to retrieve cultural asset
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information. The active RFID holds the cultural asset data directly and allows of-
fline operation without an online server connection. Mobile applications have also
been experimented with in [14, 15] where mobile devices perform local and remote
connections to get cultural asset information. Although the aforementioned systems
improve the user experience in museum visits they do not address security concerns.
Cultural asset information received on a user mobile device can be easily copied and
used for counterfeit assets.
ETG (Traceability and Guarantee Label) [16] presented recently in Vicenzaoro
Winter adds to a traditional bar code an encrypted one that contains asset informa-
tion signed with the producer’s private key. Although the digital signature it provides
data integrity it does not protect against the duplication attack since all encrypted
data can be reused and copied.
RFID technology shares many of the counterfeiting and integrity problems [17].
Passive RFID have been successfully applied to identify, catalogue and track valu-
able assets [18, 19]. They bring real-time, read/write data tracking and process
history useful for producers and users. However, passive RFIDs containing non-
encrypted information are not useful for authentication and integrity purposes. To
solve this problem two companies, Texas Instruments and VeriSign Inc., have pro-
posed a ‘chain-of-custody’ approach [20]. Their model involves managing a PKI in-
frastructure and signing the RFID information with private keys in order to provide
the integrity service. However, digital signatures do not confer cloning resistance to
tags. They prevent forging of data, but not copying of data. A solution to cloning and
corruption of passive RFIDs can be offered by active ones [17, 21, 22]. They offer
anti-cloning mechanisms and hold private keys to perform authentication and estab-
lish encrypted communication. However, advanced RFIDs still allow certain attacks.
Although anti-cloning RFIDs cannot be duplicated, they can be reused. And since
they can be physically handled by an adversary, they can be breached with appro-
priate technologies. They also require dedicated devices and exclude other kinds of
storage (e.g, graphical bar codes).
Counterfeiting and authentication of assets is so important that international or-
ganizations are trying to address it. For instance the EPC global standard for RFID
technologies proposes global object naming services [23] that provide each object a
with a unique ID. A centralised database stores asset information that can be used
to authenticate and verify the product authenticity. However, this centralised DB
poses scalability problems, requires a user to establish a remote connection and still
require time-space information to avoid duplication of asset information. In our ap-
proach although organizations coordinate to maintain a logically centralised data
base of GDs, users perform offline GD verification thus scalability is enhanced.
In [24] intrusion detection techniques are applied to detect cloned data. This ap-
proach is prone to false alarms that are not allowed in our system implementation
(especially in the case of auctions). False alarm rate is reduced in the approach pre-
sented in [25] where they provide a probabilistic based approach for location based
authentication. They use past location of products as location-based information for
counterfeit asset detections. However, our system starts from different assumptions
in fact very often previous locations of a cultural asset is unavailable but where it
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will be exhibited is known a priori. Since we are dealing with high valuable ob-
jects no false alarm is permitted. Moreover, we have introduced different security
measures (especially in the same destination area) to ensure security properties.
In [26] location information is used to address the forgery of origin information
and the transport problems of assets [26]. Each asset is equipped with a tag that
contains origin and tracking information signed with the producer private key. Tags
can be read by users for origin information and a centralised DB is used for asset
authentication. In our system we perform off line authentication verifications. We
add the concept of time and authentication history to address the problem of dupli-
cation in the same area. Moreover, our approach is formally described and security
properties are formally verified.
7 Conclusion and future works
Our place and time based system provides novel authentication and integrity ser-
vices for cultural assets. Its main contribution is the combination of both place and
time information as well as traditional security mechanisms to generate a place and
time based tag for each cultural asset. This tag avoids duplication, reuse and modi-
fication of key cultural asset information. Moreover, it prevents the introduction of
counterfeit cultural assets in the market. Our approach has been implemented and
deployed in several museums where its performance has been validated by several
users. As future work we are extending and generalising the use of place and time
information to authenticate other kinds of assets (e.g., jewels, watches and wines).
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